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The greatest problem of Europe
today may not be its
unemployment but its
complacency.
The Economist, October 22, 1994
The idea of a "common European house" was
already present in the minds of the founding fathers of
the EU. Thus, already in 1947, Jean Monnet said to Walt
Rostow, a noted American economist: "First we have to
modernise France. Without a vital France there can be no
Europe. Then we must unite Western Europe. When
Western Europe unites and gathers its strength, it will
draw in Eastern Europe. And this great East-West Europe
will be of consequence and a force of peace in the world".
France is now a modern and rich country. With the full
membership of Austria, Finland and Sweden coming into
effect on January I, 1995, the first two items of Monnet's
visionary agenda have become reality. The third one, that
of drawing in Central and Eastern Europe, now lies ahead.
The question consequently arises - what has to be done to
make this final point come true as well.
The experience of past enlargements of the EC
demonstrates that such a process is neither simple nor
ease. Some of them, such as the accession of Britain,
Denmark and Ireland as well as that of Greece, Spain and
Portugal in 1986 required additional arrangements to
accommodate the specific needs of new entrants. Given
the present economic and political situation in Central
and Eastern Europe, the obstacles and opportunities for
the accession of these countries to the EU seem much
more complex than the preceding cases. They are,
therefore, well worth a closer examintion. In this we shall
proceed at two levels -looking at the economics first, and
then at the politics of Central and East European relations
with the EU.
The economics of Central and East European
relations with the EU
After the collapse of communism in 1989, the first
thing that the democratically elected governments of
Central and East European coutries did was to declare
EC membership as their most important economic and
political goal. They did so with good reason: as their
nearest neighbour, the EC was to them not only their
natural (and, for its sheer size, also its most important)
trading partner, but also as a group of developed market
economies the most convenient source of capital and
technical expertise as well as a suitable model for the
transformation of their legal and institutional systems.
However, the establishment and development of
the relations between the Central and East European
countries and the EC (now EU) was from the beginning
beset by a fundamental misunderstanding. The EC
countries considered their overtures to the ex-communist
countries in the East as a genuine offer of help and
friendship. The new democracies of Central and Eastern
Europe considered them rather as an expression of
selfishness and arrogance. In 1990, the EC launched the
PHARE program through which it disbursed 4.28 billion
ECU (5.3 billion $). Moreover, it signed trade and co-
operation agreements with Poland, Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. These gave the
signatories access to the EC General System of Preferences
as well as the benefit of exemption from a number of EC
import quotas. Already in 1991 and 1992 the EU signed
with these countries so-called "Europe Agreements",
which accorded them the status of associated members.
These agreements provide for free trade in industrial goods
from 1995 on, in iron and steel from 1996, and in textiles
from 1997 onwards.
So far so good. From the viewpoint of Central and
East European countries all that looked somewhat
differently. The funds of the PHARE program as well as
other capital inflows were well below both their needs
and their expectations. Moreover, both trade and co-
operation agreements as well as the "European" ones
restricted the access of the ex-communist Six to the EC
market just in those industries where their comparative
advantage was the greatest (texti les, iron and steel,
chemicals, farm products). According to an analysis by
two British economists, J. Rollo andA. Smith, these sectors
accounted for 40 percent of these countries' exports.
Moreover, anti-dumping duties imposed on iron pipes
from Hungary and Poland and bans on imports of beef on
allegation of foot-and-mouth disease were taken as
evidence of the insistence of the EU on protecting its
uncompetitive sectors. Finally, the changes in the balance
of trade between the EU and the countries with "Europe
Agreements" suggest that the EU has been the bigger
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beneficiary. In 1989 the EC had a deficit of 600 million
ECU (744 million $) in trade with its poor eastern
neighbours; by the end of 1993 this deficit turned into a
surplus of 5.6 billion ECU (6.9 billion $) - including 433
million ECU (537 million $) of subsidies exports of farm
products.
No wonder that the ex-communist Six reacted
angri Iy to such a state of affairs. This became apparent at
the Copenhagen summit of the Council of Europe in June
1993. To redress things, all these countries pressed for a
rapid accession to full EU membership. Instead, the
Council decided that "the EU will start a program designed
to prepare the accession of all European countries with
which it has signed European Agreements". This initiative
has been pushed further on at the Council's summit in
.Essen in December 1994, which called on the European
Commission to prepare a White Paper on the unified
communitarian market which has to be discussed at this
years' summit to be held in Cannes in June. The Paper,
which is expected to be accepted by the associated
members, will contain guidelines on the "structuring of
relationships" between the EU and the associated members
as on the preparation for their full membership.
The discrepancy is evident: the six associated
countries insist on a rapid accession to full EU
membership; Poland and Hungary have already filed their
official requests. The EU, on the contrary, favours a
gradual approach, being prepared to consider any further
enlargement only after the Intergovernmental Conference
due to discuss the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty
in 1996. Why do they differ so sharply? The most concise
explanation was offered by the Financial Times, which in
January 1993 commented: "The non-EFTA applicants see
the EC above all as a means of bolstering their economies
and encouraging financial transfers from the wealthier
countries of Europe. The EC, however, views membership
chiefly as a reward for economic achievement, rather than
as a precondition to it". Now the good question is - who is
right after all?
It seem to us that, first, the economies of the six
countries in question are too weak to withstand the shock
of a rapid accession to the EU. The poorest present
members of the Union - Greece, Spain and Portugal -
already complain about the difficulties in bearing the
burden of com munitari an discipline. Indeed, a poor boy's
life in a rich men's club is not an easy one. As to the
"Visegrad Four" - an American economist, R. Baldwin,
has calculated that their 64 million inhabitants are only
30 per cent as rich as the EU average and far more reliant
on agriculture. They will, moreover, probably remain the
poorest of the EU for at least two decades. The same applies
roughly to Bulgaria and Romania, too.
Second, the difficulties of transition from a
command economy to an entrepreneurial one are generally
underestimated. Witness Eastern Germany: despite a fully
developed institutional and legal framework taken over
from the western part of the country and transfers on a
scale of 120 to 150 billion Deutschmarks a year, its
economy is not yet on its feet all improvements
notwithstanding. And the recent elections in Brandenburg
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and SachsenAnhalt show that the electorate is not amused
by the current state of affai rs.
Third, some may argue that the cost of the cruching
competition from the West in the case of rapid accession
may nevertheless be compensated by transfers in the form
of subsidies to farmers and aid to depressed regions.
Economists have been arguing for quite some time over
estimates of how much the new entrants may cost the
Union. An estimate published in The Economist in 1993
puts the costs of transfers from the EU regional fund and
of agricultural subsidies at 6 to 10 billion $ a year, which
means an increase of the current EC budget of 14 to 20
per cent. Mr. Baldwin estimates that only the accession
of the "Visegrad Four" would require an increase in
contributions to the EU budget of around 60 per cent, or a
severe cut in spending. The Centre d'Etudes Prospectives
et d'informations Internationales (CEPll) puts the cost of
increases in subsidies to farmers from new entrants at 15
to 30 per cent of the current budget. Whatever the exact
figure, one thing can be taken for granted: any accession
of Central and East European countries is bound to
threaten the present beneficiaries - notably farmers
throughout the Union as well as the four big recipients of
development funds: Spain, Ireland, Portugal and Greece.
They would object strongly to any newcomers threatening
to grab a slice of the cake at their expense. Since the EU
can take in new memebers only by unanimous vote, the
question arises - do the newly associated states have any
chance of full membership?
This point invites yet another question: why have
any initiatives for the enlargement of the EU taken place
at all? The first answer may be that up to the present the
Union has developed relations with the ex-communist
countries mainly to its advantage. The second is that these
initiatives might be motivated by second thoughts: Germay
may wish to shi ft the Union's point of gravity eastwards,
and to cease being on the very first frontline to a turbulent
East; the British are said to use the widening of the Union
as an impediment to its deepening, which they do not
want. And so we come to the realm of politics.
The politics of Central and East European
relations with the EU
The scope and momentum of the collapse of
communism in Central and Eastern Europe has taken
Western diplomats and politicians by complete surprise.
This has become obvious especially in the EC, where the
objective of a common foreign and security policy "which
might lead to a common defence", set out in the Maastricht
Treaty, was at the very beginnings of its implementation.
To make matters worse, Europe's foreign policy was
immediately put to the severe test of Yugoslavia's
bloodstained disintegration. The consequence was what
Jacques Delors aptly described as "Europe's humiliation".
Unfortunately, it seems that it was not only this initial
confusion that resulted in the debacle of European foreign
policy. At the time of the signature of the Maastricht
Treaty, the prevailing mood was in favour of an expanding,
federal ist Europe, for which the national governments and
OCTOBER - DECEMBER 1995
electorates had to be prepared. In the framework of these
preparations the number of decisions subject to majority
vote was augmented: moreover, a reform of the system of
voting rights was undertaken - which, as we all know,
resulted in an ugly row.
The outcome of this is a weird arithmetic about
who needs whom to push through a desired decision. Big
countries have more votes in the Council of Ministers, so
that they cannot be outvoted by a coalition of small states.
In turn, small countries are protected by a system of
weighted voting. In 1994, of the Council's 76 votes, 54
were needed to form a qualified majority, while 23 were
needed to block any decision. So the "Big Five" could
achieve a qualified majority only if they got the support
of at least two small states. Similarly, the small states
needed the backing of at least three big states to get a
majority vote. Conversely, two big states could form a
blocking majority if they got the support of any small
country but Luxembourg. Now, with any further
enlargement - who has to support whom for what becomes
anybody's guess.
Does all this exercise matter? Unfortunately it does,
because the EU is a club of members with conflicting
interests and rival cultures. Some members, such as
Germany, Holland, Denmark and Britain, say they believe
in free trade and open markets; others, such as France
and Spain, mistrust market forces which they would like
to control; some, as Germany and Britain, contribute to
the communitarian budget more than they get out of it,
while Greece, Ireland, Spain and Portugal are net
recipients. There are, in sum, many of those which John
Major once described as "fault lines". Now, with the
enlargement, especially with the ex-communist countries,
these fault lines would most probably multiply. So, the
decision-making process may be brought to a complete
halt - or, conversely, some countries may be constantly
overruled.
It seems that just these difficulties as well as a lack
of consensus on a common purpose have, during the last
year or so, brought about a change in attitude. Instead of
federalism, the new buzzword in the EU today is
"intergovernmental ism" - i.e. the practice to solve difficult
questions by argument among individual member
countries. The first consequence of this was a creeping
return to decision-making by unanimity - i.e. to
inefficiency. The second, and most disastrous one, was -
since Germany's reunification - the return to the logic of
the "European concert" as in the times before World War
I; in order to counterbalance the power by sheer size of
united Germany, Mrs. Thatcher declared (and Mr. Major's
government accepted subsequently) that this power could
be counterbalanced only by a military and political
engagement of the United States in Europe as well as by
close relations between the other two strongest sovereign
states - Britain and France.
Why was this development so disastrous? The
answer is obvious: Europe's foreign policy was pushed
into a direction which proved to be against its own best
interests. This can be easily demonstrated by the case of
Europe's policy in the Balkans.
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As we all know - Germany insisted; rightly, on the
recognition of the former Yugoslav republics.
Consequently, Britain and France were against it. True,
both countries sent their troops on a "peacekeeping
mission" - but at the same time did everything to prevent
any serious action against the Serb aggressors. True, they
dispensed humanitarian aid, but did precious little to
protect innocent civilians from Serb terrorism. It was they
who ushered the Russians into the process, whose main
goal is to protect Serbian interests. The result of all this
are at least 300 thousand casualties and about a million
of displaced persons. In the end, the Russians managed,
with the connivance of the British and the French, to make
both the United Nations and NATO look silly and helpless.
How good European foreign policy has become in solving
crucial problems has clearly been demonstrated by the
negotiations on the so-called "Pact of Stability" in March
- which left all the open questions open.
As in the case of the tragedy in the Balkans, where
a policy of appeasement only encouraged Serb barbaric
expansionism, both the American and the European
policies misfired in the case of security arrangements with
Central and East European countries. All of them were
hoping for NATO membership, as the only plausible
protection against the Russians. This is so because if any
member country is attacked, NATO considers this as an
attack on NATO as a whole. Instead, Central and East
European countries were offered a woolly arrangement in
the form ofP4P, under which NATO would only "consult"
an attacked country - and, judging by the Bosnian
experience, do nothing. Small wonder that the Russians
have become ever more assertive. Not only have they
issued a growing number of threatening statements
concerning the enlargement of NATO, but have also
started to harass even non-ex-communist countries, such
as Austria. More can be expected to come: now that the
Russians are rather firmly entrenched in Serbia (witness
Russia's treaty with Serbia on military co-operation) it
becomes rather probable that they wi II exert strong
pressure on the Ukraine and Romania (Bulgaria not
excluded) to ensure a land-based corridor to the ports of
Tivat and Bar in Montenegro. All this calls for a thorough
rethinking and a radical turnaround in Europe's security
policy.
Some of this seems to be already under way.At the
beginning of the nineties, it was widely believed that, with
the collapse of communism, the "clash of ideologies" on
which the cold war was based had come to an end and
thus every reason for serous international conflict. Hence
the prospect of a world dominated by democratic states
and market-oriented economies. It was also a prospect of
peace, ifnot harmony, since democratic states do not go
to war with each other. Consequently, all the existing
political and defence structures - notably NATO - seemed
outdated and without a proper role. Hence the idea that
the best strategy for the West in Central and Eastern
Europe was - not to irritate the Russians.
However, these ideas - probably borrowed from F.
Fukuyama's "The End of History" - have not stood the
test of time. Instead ofa prospect of peace, today's world
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looks as if set on a rather tumultuous period characterised
by manoeuverings in the framework of a multi-power
system. The source of new conflict may become what S.
Huntington, anAmerican political scientist, called a "clash
of cultures". In the case of Europe (with or without
America) that would mean the confrontation with two alien
forces -Islamic fundamentalism to the South and militant
Orthodox Slavdom to the East. The breakup of ex-
Yugoslavia, notably the war in Bosnia, may serve as a
prime example to confirm this thesis. Unfortunately, such
Huntingtonian logic appears only too plausible; moreover,
the world may, in the immediate future, become a much
more dangerous place. First, because modern technology
may enable the protagonists of any conflict to inflict much
more damage than before. Second, with the cold war over,
all the problems which up to the present have been papered
over for fear of an all-out war, are coming to the fore
again. Last not least, many countries with problems on
the domestic plane may try to divert the attention of its
public by an aggressive stance in foreign policy. Boris
Yeltsin's Russia may be an apt example to the point. To
counter the coming challenges, the EU will be forced to
formulate its objectives and muster the necessary political
will to realise and protect them.
Conclusion
What does all this mean to the ultimate goal of
Central and East European countries - accession to full
membership of the EU and ofNA TO? As we have tried to
demonstrate, there are a number of serious obstacles to
this which will not be easy to overcome. However, there
are some reasons for moderate optimism.
First, it seems as if the EU remains committed to a
policy of future widening. It does so for food reason - to
ensure prosperity and political stability on its eastern rim
and thus to avoid a number of problems - from unwanted
immigrants to threats of political turmoil. So, at the end
of 1994, negotiations with the Baltic states for association
have started, and respective agreements are scheduled to
be signed by the end of June. Negotiations to the same
end have also started with Slovenia - a worthly candidate
- while both Croatia and Bosnia will have to wait for an
end of their war with Serbia. A possible accession of the
Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus will, however, depend on
how hard the Russians insist on the control of their "near
abroad". The same applies, unfortunately, to Romania and
Bulgaria as well.
As to the policy of Central and East European
countries towards full membership in the EU, it seems
that they had better change tactics. Instead of pressing
for early membership, they should rather try to extract
further concessions from the EU (besides those already
scheduled for the following years) and promote mutual
co-operation instead. Something in this direction is already
under way: in April 1994 the "Visegrad Four" have
decided to speed up the lowering of trade barriers, and a
spate of studies on the promotion of mutual trade,
sponsored i.a. by the TRADELINK Project, have been
published. The recommendations that they have put
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forward, which range from the strengthening of the
banking system, education of the new entrepreneurial
class, the setup of a viable system of business information,
to the completion of the institutional and legal system as
well as further lowering of internal trade barriers, show
how much has to be done and how justified a postponement
of their accession to the EU really is.
A better stimulus to the development of these
countries would be to use the CEFT A of the "Visegrad
Four" as a "halfway house" to prepare themselves for the
rigours of EU membership, and extending it to the other
countries of the region. The Central European Initiative
could be used as an adequate means to that end, through
which these countries have already developed mutual co-
operation in various fields.
The obstacle of potential ungovernability must be
solved for the sake of the Union itself. Unless the
Intergovernmental Conference on the implementation of
the Maastricht Treaty in 1996 succeeds to define a
common purpose and find a solution for the management
of the EU as such, the Union will drown in variable
geometry, multi-track, multi-speed, two-tier, hard-core,
concentric-circle or a la carte anarchy. The debate on the
relevant topics has already started, and it will, no doubt,
be lively to the end; so, let us hope for the best.
Even the problem of subsidies to farmers may, with
luck, in the future be less formidable than at present. The
GATT Agreement of the Uruguay Round, coming this
year into force, is bound to lower the EU's external tariffs
and require cuts in subsidies to the EU's farm exports by
21 per cent in volume and by 36 per cent in value. This
may also lower the EU's barriers to Eastern European
exports offarm products and reduce the opposition to EU
membership - notably for small countries less dependent
on agriculture such as the Czech Republic or Slovenia.
Others may follow later. In the meantime, the best thing
the countries waiting for accession can do is to speed up
their development: the more developed they become the
less development aid they may need and the more
acceptable they may become to other members of the
Union. "Help thyself and God will help you" - is a known
capitalist that we in the ex-socialist countries have to learn.
As to the political aspect - let us only mention that,
on the economic side the problem of monetary union,
employment policies and the further deepening of the
Union are the most pressing problems, on the political
side the most urgent one is the consolidation of NA TO
and a firm commitment to include the Central and East
European countries. In that sense the recent American
announcement of a plan to enlarge NATO deserves full
support. A firm stance in the defence of its positions is
also indispensable. John F. Kennedy once said that he
would never fear to negotiate, but that he would never
negotiate out of fear. In the case of the EU, the latter has
happened only too often recently and what the basis of
Europe's relations to the rest of the world should be is
already well established in the UN Charter and the
Helsinki Agreement. Punishment of armed aggression,
settlement of disputes through negotiations, security of
existing borders, freedom of any country to choose its
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political system, protection of human rights - should be
always defended in any case and at any cost. Is this sterile
moralism? Among the many paradoxes of pol itics,
consequent moralism is sometimes ultimate pragmatism.
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If Europe's politicians achieve this, at least in Europe the
stature of international law may be upheld; and only thus
Monnet's vision of "a great East-West Europe will be of
consequence and a force of peace in the world". •
